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EDITORS  W
hat can IBSA offer to the global community? It is with this
provocative question that IPC-IG reports on the policy dialogue
that took place in the Fourth IBSA Academic Forum, which was
held on 12-13 April 2010 in Brasilia before the meeting of the heads of state.
If IBSA reflects a new power structure in which the Global South has more voice,
then it also can and should contribute to the global development debate.
The three countries have been successfully experimenting with innovative
policies in areas such as healthcare and social protection, as well as in
development cooperation through IBSA’s Fund for Alleviation of Poverty.
This issue of Poverty in Focus brings together articles by speakers on the four
panels organized. They address the role of non-contributory cash transfers and
employment programmes, the debates on healthcare innovation, intellectual
property rights and access to essential drugs, and the discussions about IBSA’s
role and potential as a plurilateral arrangement.
Lyal White starts by taking stock of IBSA’s progress in the seven years since
it was launched in 2003. He argues that, given the economic crisis, IBSA’s role
can be more relevant than ever. It has made significant progress on political
coordination and development cooperation, though the substance in the
working groups remains a challenge.
Fábio Soares and Radhika Lal take an integrative approach to social development,
linking cash transfers and employment programmes with a view to addressing
vulnerability across the life cycle. The IBSA countries offer a good example of
rights-based frameworks, and have a vision of moving beyond schemes to more
comprehensive systems.
Amita Sharma describes the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA)
and emphasises the legal approach whereby NREGA is seen as a service provided
by the government, an entitlement that involves public scrutiny and participation
at a local level. NREGA has links to other policy areas, revealing the potential for
integration that has been the great challenge of social policy in India.
Ingrid Woolard discusses how South Africa’s Unemployment Insurance Fund
is limited. She argues for greater integration between social assistance and
labour-market policies. There is still no coherent system in place, and the fiscal
sustainability of these policies will be a major concern as the country confronts
a tougher growth environment.
Sergei Soares shows the differences between taking account of a transversal
definition of income (income in a given month) and a longitudinal one (income
during the next 24 months) when calculating the targets for Brazil’s Bolsa Família.
The longitudinal poverty rate is about twice the transversal poverty figure,
thus explaining the mismatch between the targets and the eligible population.
Radhika Lal gives an overview of the discussions on healthcare and points to
problems in the field of trade-related intellectual property rights. Potential areas
for collaboration between the IBSA countries include sharing information on drug
prices and on sources of low-cost drugs, as well as research and development for
drugs that treat neglected diseases.
Biswajit Dhar and Reji Joseph express their concern for the weak legal distinction
between substandard medicines and counterfeit drugs. Since laws on the matter
apply to both branded and generic drugs, there is a risk of equating authorised
generics with counterfeit products. This could disrupt the trade in generics
and thus hamper access to crucial life-saving medicines in the Global South.
Kamal Mitra Chenoy argues that plurilateralism in arrangements like IBSA can
add value to multilateralism only if it can connect the excluded countries of the
South to the blocs of the North. He also argues that plurilateralism is valuable
if it goes beyond the interests of capital and helps create a people-centred
development paradigm.
Alcides Costa Vaz closes this Poverty in Focus with a discussion of the different
approaches taken by each of the IBSA countries. As a flexible mechanism,
however, IBSA should be able to accommodate the different perspectives.
There is a follow-up to this debate. For more information, visit www.ipc-undp.org.
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by Lyal White,
University of Pretoria IBSA Seven Years On:
Cooperation in a New Global Order1
With the global economy
at a precipice and
emerging powers
playing an increasing
part in agenda setting,
IBSA’s role can be











Launched in Brasilia in June 2003,
IBSA was hailed as an alliance of like-
minded democracies from the developing
South. Its member countries wanted
a loose arrangement without a fixed
secretariat but with an ambitious agenda
focused on global governance and
intersectoral cooperation.
Now, seven years later and after its
fourth summit, IBSA is no longer in
its infancy. With the global economy at a
precipice and emerging powers playing
an increasing part in agenda setting,
its role can be more relevant than ever.
Officials from all three countries insist
it has achieved much in a short time:
encouraging active dialogue among
members, promoting cooperation in
key ministries and adding its collective
weight in multilateral fora.
But critics argue that progress has been
slow and that results fall far short of
initial lofty ambitions. One observer
describes IBSA as little more than a
“gathering of friends”.
Some suggest that the members
themselves differ on their perceptions
of its role. India and Brazil are emerging
economic powers that wield enormous
influence unilaterally, while South Africa
benefits from being part of a heavyweight
collective that bolsters its global influence.
For Brazil, IBSA forms part of a Southern
development strategy that cuts across
government ministries. India maintains
a low profile, using IBSA to drive its
multilateral agenda and generate
credibility on its nuclear aspirations.
Given global developments and the
divergent views on IBSA, it is important
to evaluate progress in the global
arena and its future as a forum for
dialogue and action.
Taking Stock Six Years On
IBSA has significantly improved
relations among India, Brazil and
South Africa. It is a platform for
dialogue and exchange between
ministries and nongovernmental entities.
More importantly, it has created a common
culture of constructive cooperation.
Its greatest achievement to date is
in political coordination, something
that previously was impulsive at best.
One Brazilian academic describes Brazil’s
South-South agenda in earlier decades
as non-committal. The country “talked-
the-talk” but never really “signed up or
paid the price”. Today it is arguably the
most active partner, with development
projects across Africa and Latin America,
and is a driving force for multilateral
decision-making. Coordination is most
evident at the United Nations, where
there is a 96 per cent vote convergence
among IBSA countries. The reform of
global institutions, especially the Security
Council, has always been a priority.
While strategies for achieving permanent
seats for IBSA members vary, demands
for reform and representation do not.
Economic realities hamper market
convergence. Trade among the three
countries has increased impressively,
from US$3.9 billion in 2003 to about
US$12 billion in 2009. But compared
to trade between China and Brazil
(US$36 billion in 2009) it is still small.
Officials working on IBSA concede
that market integration is a pipe dream.
Insurmountable regional constraints
predate the alliance. A trilateral agreement
would have to include other regional
partners, particularly the Southern
African Customs Union and the Southern
Common Market (Mercosur), which
would ensure an endless negotiating
battle. A more realistic goal might be an
1.  A longer, original version of this
article was published as Policy Briefing 8 by the
South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)
in November 2009.4 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
arrangement that simply declares
existing agreements between the
regional blocs to fall under an IBSA
umbrella. But this would be more
symbolic than coherent trade integration.2
Facilitating trade through improved
connectivity and harmonised policies
would be a more pertinent and
achievable target.
IBSA has 17 government-to-government
working groups that regularly exchange
knowledge and experience—a practical
approach to trilateral development
cooperation. And there are seven
people-to-people fora that meet at
annual summits to encourage
non-governmental relations.
The working groups have had mixed
results. Science and technology seem
to be leading the way; joint initiatives
include a research trip to Antarctica.
They also share technology on biofuels,
a cross-cutting issue that affects other
important working groups, such as those
on climate change and energy.
In revenue services, Brazil has established
a special unit, based on the South African
model, to deal specifically with large
taxpayers, while South Africa and India
explore the information technology that
has helped Brazil improve revenue
collection and efficiency.
The business forums have yielded
impressive results. Where there was
little or no formal dialogue before,
the business sector has now become
an active and visible gathering on the
sidelines at IBSA summits. The small
business forum is creating a database
of all small and medium businesses
in all three countries.
Outside of government and even within
certain ministries, however, criticism
of IBSA and its working groups is
unanimous: these groups have proved
more complicated than expected. Results
have been slow in coming, and there is a
need for greater coherence and focus.
Development Fund Success
The IBSA development fund has
become an unexpected success story.
By applying a simple, effective approach
to development assistance, it has delivered
positive results relatively quickly.
With a small annual contribution of
US$1 million per member, the fund is
administered by the United Nations
Development Programme and targets
small, localised projects in some of the
most impoverished parts of the world.
Three projects have been completed:
a waste management project in Haiti,
small-scale agricultural development in
Guinea Bissau and a healthcare clinic
in Cape Verde. Other projects are under
way: an HIV/AIDS testing and counselling
centre in Burundi and a sports centre in
Palestine. Negotiations are also taking
place with Laos, Cambodia and
East Timor.
The development fund liaises with local
government and partners with local
operators, which is important to
avoid any impression of a new
wave of imperialism.
These projects could be the green shoots
of a new core priority, driving the three
countries toward greater development
cooperation in their own regions.




IBSA has always maintained a strong
focus on development. Shortly after its
creation, it characterised itself as a forum
for “economic development and social
equity”.3 This description covered the
many challenges facing each country
while expressing a broader intention to
improve development and integration in
Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Brazil has been a particularly strong
proponent of development, embracing
cooperation as a foreign policy priority.
As an “emerging provider” (not just an
emerging power), it is eager to share
knowledge with less developed
countries. Paulo Sotero, Director of the
Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson
Center in Washington, describes this as a
“spirit of genuine solidarity ... a social and
political—rather than economic—
motivation in Brazilian international
cooperation initiatives”.4
Brazilians have started calling this
innovative blend of social assistance
and technical support “social technology”.
Africa is clearly a priority for Brazil, which
sees South Africa as an essential partner
and IBSA as a potential forum to boost
existing activities. Of its 318 technical
cooperation projects abroad, 125 are
in 19 African countries.
Building on existing linkages, Brazilian
officials indicate that IBSA could
be an effective vehicle to promote
Brazil’s development agenda. And India,
Brazil and South Africa could collapse
certain existing bilateral programmes
(such as those mentioned above) and
combine with the development fund to
form a larger IBSA cooperation initiative
with third countries. Thus the fund
could be augmented and its overall
impact enhanced.
IBSA and Emerging Groupings
The rise of Brazil–Russia–India–China
(BRIC) as a formal grouping after its
first summit in June 2009 is widely
misunderstood. BRIC is little more than a
collection of emerging economic powers,
a term coined by Jim O’Neil of Goldman
Sachs. While it is expected to dwarf the
G7 economically within 20–30 years,
the reality is that these countries
have little in common.
The June summit yielded little consensus
and most observers, including O’Neil
himself, doubt BRIC will become an active
grouping. It may, however, prompt
certain broad economic reforms and
push for a restructuring of the global
financial architecture. It is, after all, a
prominent grouping that has captured
world attention.
5
But its role is very different from that of
IBSA. Certainly factions in Brazil see BRIC
much as South Africa views IBSA—as a
forum to bolster its power and influence
on the global stage. This appeals to
interests outside government (especially
business), prompting some to question
whether BRIC will replace or has replaced
IBSA in the minds of Brazilians and
Indians and, if so, where this leaves
South Africa.
BRIC, however, satisfies only a small
part of the international vision of IndiaPoverty in Focus    5
and Brazil. IBSA operates in a different
dimension, one with a stronger
development focus that may be more
politically palatable. Africa features
prominently in the foreign policy agenda
of both Brazil and India for commercial
and sentimental reasons. So IBSA
and South Africa are needed.
Conclusion
Seven years on, IBSA has a mixed record.
Critics believe outcomes have been
slow and substance has been lacking.
But this view is based on commercial
expectations and the organisation’s role
in global agenda setting. The reality is
that IBSA has improved constructive
relations between India, Brazil and
South Africa while raising the profile
of South-South dialogue. Cooperation
on development is clearly an area of
success that can and should be exploited.
Development as a priority cuts across
various IBSA working groups and is the
rationale behind discussions in non-
governmental fora. The development
fund in particular has become a conduit
for cooperation between IBSA members
and recipient countries in the developing
world. This could extend to improved
technical cooperation and the transfer
of social technology to underdeveloped
countries, mostly in Africa.
Development cooperation distinguishes
IBSA from other emerging configurations
like BRIC. In the wake of international
financial turmoil and a much talked-
about “shift” to a multipolar world order
from West to East, the hype around
groupings of emerging powers is
to be expected. But BRIC is founded on
economic imperatives, not on a move to
development and political cooperation,
as is IBSA. That is why IBSA and BRIC can
and should coexist. 
2. A preferential trade agreement exists between the
Southern African Customs Union and Mercosur.
3. This was reiterated in a statement by Brazilian
Foreign Minister Celso Amorim at an IBSA gathering in
August 2005.
4. See P. Sotero (2009). ‘Brazil as an Emerging Donor:
Huge Potential and Growing Pains’, Development
Outreach. Washington, DC, World Bank Institute:
<http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/
articleid526.html>.
5. The BRIC countries released a joint statement in
anticipation of the G20 summit in Pittsburgh in
September 2009.
The IBSA countries
could learn from each
other regarding the right-
based laws and entitlements
to create and sustain a basic
social protection framework.
Employment guarantee
schemes and public works






especially when they are
framed within the framework
of a life-cycle approach.
Social protection, particularly social
assistance, can be viewed as a key pillar
of inclusive growth in the IBSA countries.
Emerging evidence suggests that the
three countries have demonstrated the
potential to adopt and implement large
social assistance programmes effectively,
and their own experience points to the
potentially significant positive impacts
of such policies on macroeconomic
resilience, equity and poverty reduction.
The first two panels of the IBSA Academic
Forum 2010 sought to take stock
of the different dimensions of social
development strategies in each of them.
The aim was to promote dialogue on
complementarities in public employment
and cash transfer-based approaches to
social protection, as well as to identify
issues for learning and exchange
between the three countries.
As a result of their own institutional
histories and political contexts, their
approaches to social assistance have
varied. India has focused closely on
addressing the employment dimensions
of social protection, for example by
means of the Mahatma Gandhi National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(MGNREGA). Brazil is well known for its
social transfers, especially Bolsa Família,
a large-scale conditional cash transfer
programme. South Africa has paid much
attention to child support grants and
old age pensions, as well as public works.
Its Expanded Public Works Programme
(EPWP) involves a focus on social
and environmental services and
conservation, and more recently
a community-driven approach to
public employment programmes.
While these various programmes have
been effective, the three countries also
seem interested in exploring how to go
beyond their current achievements in
order to better integrate or expand
the employment and/or social transfer
dimension of their social development
The Emerging
Dialogue on Social
Strategies in the IBSA Countries
by Radhika Lal and Fábio Veras Soares,
International Policy Centre
for Inclusive Growth
Note: All the presentations mentioned are available at
the webpage of the IBSA Academic Forum: <http://
www.ipc-undp.org/ipc/PageIBSA.do?id=205>.6 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
strategies. The goal would be to make
them more comprehensive; address gaps
(unemployed youth, for example); and
identify ways of tackling fiscal constraints
on the expansion of programmes as they
are currently designed, by integrating
them more fully and streamlining them.
More specifically, the sessions of the




The initial set of speakers (Katherine
Hall and Ingrid Wollard of South Africa
and Luciana Jaccoud of Brazil) began by
describing the framework and basic pillars
of the social protection frameworks in
their countries. Cash transfers are a
relatively recent phenomenon in India,
but the Brazilian and South African
constitutions have enshrined social
assistance as a right, and both countries
have well established programmes that
have been stepped up. In South Africa
they include the old age pension,
disability child support, foster care and
care dependency grant programmes; and
in Brazil the universal non-contributory
rural pension, the old age and disability
benefit (BPC) and Bolsa Família.
Brazil has a long tradition of social
protection and a comprehensive benefits
system that includes means-tested
benefits for the elderly, the disabled,
the extremely poor and poor families
with children. The means-tested and
unconditional BPC represents an income
guarantee for those living in extreme
poverty, and for those who cannot
work and live an independent life. It is a
constitutional right and the value of the
benefit is equal to one minimum wage,
since its rationale is to replace earned
income. Spending on social transfers has
increased in the past decade in line with
a policy of real increases in the minimum
wage, to which both BPC and the rural
pension are linked.
The two main targeted social transfers
(Bolsa Família and BPC) together accounted
for a third of the recent fall in inequality
while accounting for less than 1 per cent
of total income. In South Africa, social
assistance based on unconditional cash
transfers covers 14 million individuals
(about 30 per cent of the population)
each month and accounts for 3.5 per cent
of GDP. While cash transfers have had a
significant impact on inequality in Brazil,
the inequality effects in South Africa
appear to be a more complex
phenomenon to disentangle.
The presentations considered contrasting
approaches to “conditionality” and the
evolution of the discourse on the matter
(see the presentations by Katherine Hall
on South Africa and Luciana Jaccoud on
Brazil at the webpage of the IBSA Academic
Forum), as well as the implications of
different measures of poverty for eligibility
and coverage (Sergei Soares on Brazil).
Unlike South Africa, Brazil chose to adopt
conditionalities—or more appropriately,
co-responsibilities—for the Bolsa Família
programme, which otherwise resembles
the child support grant in many respects.
In South Africa, beneficiaries were initially
expected to show proof that the children
for whom they were applying were, for
example, immunised. But this and other
requirements, such as participation in
development programmes, were
discontinued after it became clear that
these programmes did not exist in many
areas and that in these conditions such
requirements were “discriminating” against
children who were already disadvantaged
in their access to healthcare. Nonetheless,
speakers also alluded to an emerging
discourse on “soft conditionalities” in
South Africa. They raised concerns about
the potential for placing an additional
burden on applicants and government
officials, while added value in terms of
enhanced development impacts
was much less evident.
In India, social transfers are not as
widespread as in the other two countries,
though India recently expanded the
eligibility criteria of its National Old Age
Pension Scheme (NOAPS) to cover the
elderly living below the poverty line,
not only the destitute. But its largely
decentralised nature (state-level
programmes in addition to the
central government programme) poses
challenges to ensuring coverage and to
providing adequate levels of payment,
especially in the poorer states. The main
innovative cash transfer-type programme
discussed in the Academic Forum, Ladli,
has an explicit gender dimension.
Ladli, which in some states also includes
a social security pension allowance
scheme, aims to change parents’
behaviour towards their daughters.
Under the scheme, with the birth of a
second daughter on or after 20 August
2005, both the mother and the newborn
receive an annual transfer for five years;
the amount is invested and matures
when the second daughter reaches
the age of 18.
This programme was initially launched
by the governments of Delhi and
Haryana, and is now being extended to
several other states with some design
variations. A point of interest in the
discussions was the Indian government’s
“convergence” approach to different
programmes. In particular, Mission
Convergence has been set up in the
Union Territory of Delhi to integrate
different social protection programmes





programmes have been proposed as
short-term measures and/or as safety
nets. But the deployment of MGNREGA in
India and EPWP in South Africa indicates
the potential of locating these
programmes within a longer-term
development rationale. Amita Sharma
pointed out that while India has a long
history of public employment and public
works programmes, MGNREGA is
innovative in the way it leverages social
protection as a developmental pillar
for inclusive growth. In that connection,
moreover, what is central for the policy
innovations enabled by MGNREGA is that
it has made social protection—in the form
of access to 100 days of employment per
rural household—a legal entitlement.
South Africa has also introduced
It was discussed that
policies that promote
cash transfers for children
should be enhanced in
the three countries.Poverty in Focus    7
innovations into the traditional public
works model by including social services
such as care activities as one of its areas,
rather than focusing solely on
infrastructure projects.
In Brazil, public works programmes
have not been on the agenda in recent
decades. Much of the government’s effort
with regard to employment policies has
revolved around the establishment of a
Public Employment System encompassing
an unemployment benefit (as a passive
employment policy) and job-placement
and training (as an active employment
policy, mostly covering formal-sector
workers). The inclusion of informal-sector
workers into this system has happened at
a slow pace and on a small scale through
training, income generation and microcredit
programmes (see the presentation
by Roberto Gonzales on the webpage
of the IBSA Academic Forum). In his
presentation, Marcelo Neri pointed out
that microcredit has yielded good results,
particularly in the Northeast, the poorest
region in the country.
According to some researchers, however,
the predominant focus on the “supply side”
has led to a suboptimal level of integration
between the mechanisms available for
the government to coordinate private-
sector investment through credit and
government-procurement mechanisms
and a proactive employment policy.
The success of such programmes also
depends on having an economy that
creates jobs and/or other mechanisms to
enhance income-generating opportunities.
Participants also discussed the
effectiveness of current policies to
address youth unemployment in the
three countries. Recently a wage subsidy
has been proposed in South Africa to
tackle youth unemployment in particular,
the rationale being that securing a first
job is vital to an individual’s future
involvement in the labour market.
Morné Oosthuizen of South Africa
mentioned the government’s pledge to
lower the unemployment rate from 26
per cent in 2004 to 13 per cent in 2014, as
well as to narrow the coverage gap for
19–59 year olds, since the social security
system focuses on children, the elderly,
people with disabilities and ex formal-
sector workers who are unemployed
(up to six months only). He said that
EPWP has had little impact on labour
intensity. Only 14 per cent of the
beneficiaries report having a sustainable
job post-EPWP and the programme is still
small: it reaches only 13.6 per cent of the
unemployed. Current challenges include
ensuring that the objectives and target
groups are clear, enhancing training for
longer-term impact, and developing
synergy with other programmes.
Rudy Dicks, also from South Africa,
argued that provinces and municipalities
that require greater intervention do not
have the capacity and/or structures to
roll out EPWP. A new approach is the
Community Work Programme, an
Social Development Strategy
The three IBSA countries put forward a joint paper on social development
strategies on 15 April. The strategy centres on the following principles:
 Moving from flagships to comprehensive social protection. Increasingly, the three
countries are moving towards providing social protection across the life cycle
through a combination of social insurance, social assistance policies and
access to social services.
 Addressing vulnerabilities and fostering social and economic inclusion. Social
development does not simply involve quantitative advances but also includes
critical normative elements. On the one hand, it involves a focus on addressing
problems of poverty and expanding access to quality education and healthcare;
on the other hand, it also involves addressing issues of social exclusion such as
discrimination and lack of voice in social and economic processes.
 Investing in human capital and ensuring access to basic services. There is a need
for a strong, state-led investment policy to guarantee supply, including access to
and the quality of these services.
 Ensuring food security. The countries recognise that food security is a pre-requisite
for social development, something that was brought home by recent trends
involving dramatic food price rises and price variations.
 Promoting civil society participation and deepening democracy. The countries are
conscious of the need to ensure effective partnerships with civil society in policy
development, and to strengthen accountability in implementation for effective
service delivery by institutionalising civil society forums.
 Working towards sustainable development. In recent years there has been growing
awareness of the need to address issues at the intersection of poverty and the
environment. Facilitating adaptation and mitigation through social protection,
and identifying opportunities for strengthening livelihood diversification, are
emerging as priorities in many areas.
 Embracing local knowledge and culture. The importance of incorporating local
culture and knowledge into sector-specific programmes on education, health,
agriculture practices and water management—both for the benefit of local
communities and as a valuation of their contribution to continued global cultural
diversity—is being explored in the three countries. This process is to benefit not
only the IBSA partners but also third countries interacting with IBSA through
development cooperation projects.
area-based initiative tasked with
identifying opportunities for  “useful
work” at the local level. The programme
can thus target spatial poverty traps and
provide a source of income security over
time. It aims to increase the probability
that people can earn sufficient incomes
from multiple economic opportunities
by supplementing existing livelihood
strategies—without displacing them
or the contribution they make to
household income.
Moving Towards a More Integrated
Portfolio of Pro-Poor Social Policies
in the IBSA Countries?
It was noted during the discussions that,
to date, many policymakers have viewed8 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
employment guarantee schemes and
public works and cash transfers as
competing policy instruments. This is
despite the complementarities between
the programmes, especially when they
are placed in the framework of a life-
cycle approach to social protection, and
when the current fiscal constraints on
the expansion of purely grant-based
programmes are considered.
The policy dialogue identified two key
areas for follow-up: knowledge sharing
between the countries to inform
programme design and reform,
by drawing on the experience of
other IBSA partners; and discussion
of consolidation/integration and
convergence of social protection
policies’ different components, as
well as with regard to other
development policies.
For example, it is taken for granted that
education has a key role to play in
reducing inequality. How can education
strategy and social development
programmes be better integrated to
ensure that this outcome is realised over
the long-term? Sharing evidence-based
research on policies to tackle
unemployment and promote decent
work, particularly for youths, was
identified as a priority.
It was acknowledged that policies
that promote cash transfers for children
should be improved in the three countries,
and that the IBSA partners could learn
from each other as regards rights-based
laws and entitlements to create and
sustain a basic social protection framework.
The discussion also underscored
the need to explore approaches to
programme design—approaches that
would be empowering and effective
in addressing social vulnerabilities
and other barriers to access to social
services, including education and
healthcare, shelter (housing), and food,
nutritional and income security. 
MGNREGA opens up
development possibilities
not only as a result of










to be earmarked for women.
Social Protection
Policy Innovation in India
by Amita Sharma,
Ministry of Rural Development,
India
India has a long history of
wage employment and public works
programmes. What is innovative about
the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)
of 2005 is the way it leverages social
protection as a developmental pillar for
inclusive growth. Related to that, moreover,
what is central for the policy innovations
made possible by MGNREGA is that it has
made social protection—in the form of
access to 100 days of employment per
rural household—a legal entitlement.
In India this has had a number of
transformative effects. Among other
things, it has allowed for the timely
scaling-up of public employment
programmes, reduced leakages, and
provided a participatory mechanism for
local infrastructure needs to be identified
and addressed. The MGNREGA platform
opens up development possibilities and
pathways out of poverty. This is not only
as a result of its provision of wage
employment to otherwise underemployed
rural households and its impact on
livelihoods through assets creation, but
also because of its transformational and
empowerment role, as well as its support
to continuous policy innovation.
What actually underpins these
developments?
The Difference a Rights-Based
Framework Makes
By enacting a law, the government
created a normative framework of
obligations and made itself accountable
for their realisation. This opens up space
for engagement and criticism, as well as
for active intervention by civil society
organisations, citizens and the media.
It also brings transparency to government
processes, and in this case has helped
prepare the ground for the adoption
of structured transparency and public
accountability provisions that are
instrumental for the realisation
of its rights-based framework.
A rights-based law also facilitates a
transition from discretionary allocation
by the state to the independent exercise
of choice and rights by citizens, and
compels the government to develop
responsive systems.
The right to demand employment
promotes a shift from a “delivery centre”
approach to social programmes
(managed by a bureaucracy that providesPoverty in Focus    9
facilities according to predetermined
norms and budgets, and thus excludes
a fair number of needs that do not
fall within these norms) to a “service”
approach, whereby the services have to
be structured flexibly in order to meet
the rights demanded.
Workers’ rights are safeguarded by a
legal document in the form of a job card,
which enables the registered household
to demand employment and also bears
information on entitlements accessed,
a record of the days worked and wages
paid. Those rights are also protected by
mandated transparency measures such
as social audits, and by an entitlement to
compensation such as an unemployment
allowance, if work is not provided within
15 days of being requested, and the
payment of minimum wages.
MGNREGA promotes these innovations
as non-negotiable mandates that are
contained in the main body of the act
and that can only be changed through
Parliament. Two of its schedules,
however, specify operational procedures
that the Ministry of Rural Development
can modify, making the programme’s
design flexible and allowing it to
respond dynamically to circumstances.
The law’s design also creates institutional
space for flexibility and innovation
through its focus on decentralisation,
with a pivotal role being assigned to
local bodies (Panchayat Raj Institutions) for
planning, monitoring and implementation.
Funds, functions, and functionaries are
transferred to local bodies, especially
the village body (Gram Panchayat), and
districts have the authority to prepare
context-specific plans within the overall
legal norms. Planning at the local level
allows local bodies to plan public works
for their own development and to
participate in decision-making, thus
ensuring that there is a stronger sense
of ownership and that the projects have
greater relevance for the village economy.
To meet labour demand, new
instruments for ascertaining budget
requirements have been developed.
Budgets estimating labour demand
and the cost of works are formulated by
districts on the basis of proposals from
the village assembly (Gram Sabha) and
the local bodies, especially at the village
level. States can negotiate the scale of
central assistance to meet their labour
demand. The initial central budget
provision may be increased if labour
demand rises, and the best testimony
to demand-based budgeting is that
MGNREGA budget support rose during
the global recession. Furthermore, an
incentive–disincentive structure is
created, with the centre funding 90
per cent of the employment cost and
the local state providing the
unemployment allowance.
MGNREGA’s wage rate policy
demonstrates how a social protection
strategy can empower the wage-seeker
to negotiate wages. The wage rate
remains flexible: there is an attempt to
balance a floor rate with other options
(minimum agricultural wage, market
wage) by linking the current MGNREGA
wage rate of 100 rupees with the cost of
living index, thus avoiding the need to
artificially depress or inflate it below
the minimum wages for agricultural
labourers or the market wage. To enable
workers to earn the minimum daily wage,
the states conduct time and motion studies
with a view to developing a schedule of
rates for labour-intensive projects.
Linking wage rates with task outcomes
and focusing on green jobs has created
a bifocal strategy of employment and
sustainable productivity. The works
category permits both individual benefits
and public assets. The typology of works
facilitates the meeting of both short-
and longer-term needs, since it lists
desired outcomes rather than specific
works per se in the classification: that is,
water conservation, drought proofing,
flood proofing, minor irrigation,
land development.
This offers great flexibility in designing
initiatives and makes it possible to
leverage convergence between MGNREGA
and other programmes, thereby allowing
a wide variety of activities to be carried
out as integrated projects, especially on
the individual lands holdings of scheduled
caste, scheduled tribe, below-the-poverty-
line families, and small and marginal
farmers. More specifically, convergence
programming guidelines promote
income generating activities related to
agriculture, fisheries and horticulture
on the basis of MGNREGA in works
connected to land development,
irrigation and plantation. The work list
also has space for new initiatives projects
to be proposed in order to respond to
new needs.
A Focus on Transparency, and on
Financial and Social Inclusion
Grounding a social protection strategy in
legal rights has led to the evolution of
transparency instruments that challenge
established relations and stimulate
creative ways of ensuring transparency.
The right to information (RTI) is integrated
into MGNREGA: information is proactively
placed in the public domain, especially
through an online information system
(www.nrega.nic.in). There it is possible
to track work and payments relating to
a job card number from the muster roll
through to the bank/post office account
into which wages were paid. Data can
be entered online and the website
automatically points to defaults,
aberrations and delays in transactions
related to the works.
Efforts are being made to deepen
the provision of information and
communications technology infrastructure
down to the Gram Panchayat or village
level. This is expected to trigger
innovations at the grassroots level
by helping workers to assert their
rights more effectively and hold
implementation agencies accountable.
Moreover, in order to facilitate greater
transparency, wages are paid through
workers’ institutional accounts. Ninety
million such accounts have already
been opened in banks and post offices.
Through this process of financial
inclusion, workers are expected to be
able to avail themselves of the benefits
of mainstream banking services such as
loans, microcredit and so on.
By enacting a law,
the government created
a normative framework
of obligations and made
itself accountable for
their realisation.10 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
Because of the large-scale, decentralised
nature of programme implementation,
coupled with its multidisciplinary
nature, the strategy for monitoring and
evaluating MGNREGA at the central level
has involved setting up professional
institutional networks. These comprise
leading professional institutions such
as the Indian Institutes of Management,
the Indian Institutes of Technology,
agricultural universities and important
administrative and research institutions.
They are expected to work as a resource
support system by undertaking field
appraisals and diagnoses, and by
suggesting remedial action. This system
has the advantage of relating problem
analysis to possible solutions, assessing
which factors work positively to promote
the act’s objectives, and documenting
and sharing insights and practices
for cross-learning.
The government is encouraging
similar networks at each level of
implementation—that is, at the state
and district levels—in order to ensure
concurrent monitoring and feedback
from the field. A group of 100 eminent
citizens is being formed to monitor the
programme. Further, the act allows for
statutory institutional mechanisms such
as the Central Employment Guarantee
Council (CEGC). The latter facilitates
dialogue among different stakeholders:
academics, activists, elected representatives,
experts and bureaucrats.
The e-knowledge network is for
dissemination and the sharing of local
solutions among policy practitioners
and policymakers.
To facilitate dialogue and enhance
this framework for policy innovation,
six working groups have been set up,
involving representatives of civil society,
professional institutions and state
governments. The members are expected
to recommend reform of various policy
and operational aspects of the act.
The groups are:
 planning and work execution;
 transparency and accountability;
 wages;
 needs of special groups and equity;
 works on individual land holdings
and convergence; and
 capacity building.
Since branches of banks and post offices
are often at a distance from the village,
efforts are also being made to provide
easy access by means of a “business
correspondent model”. As in Brazil,
authorised “business correspondents”
resident in the village would serve as
“banking outposts” and would be
authorised to make payments and
deposits through points of service
(including hand-held devices)
connected to the banking system.
A partnership with the Unique
Identification Authority of India is
also underway to introduce the use of
biometrics through hand-held devices,
so as to enable the development of
an “end-to-end” solution for workers
ranging from marking their application
to recording attendance and
making payments. The search for
solutions to ensure workers’ rights
and transparency is stimulating
technological and financial service
innovations in rural areas. It is also
prompting innovative ways of ensuring
public scrutiny, such as through
social audits and the use of citizen
information boards at worksites to
provide details of muster rolls,
ongoing work, allocated funds,
the wage rate and so on.
MGNREGA’s mandated use of social
audits by the village assembly
(Gram Sabha) goes beyond the right
to information and serves to ensure
accountability and corrective measures.
Partnerships between government and
civil society, the training of local resource
persons, social mobilisations around the
social audit forum and Gram Sabhas,
and the use of community-based
organisations such as self-help groups
are just some ways in which social audits
are sought to be made more effective.
The office of a district ombudsman is
also being created in all states. Though
they are not part of the formal judicial
mechanism, the aim is to introduce
independent mechanisms to redress
grievances and enforce public
accountability. Furthermore, in order
to generate awareness and improve
transparency and accountability,
including in record maintenance
at the level of the Gram Panchayat,
village resource centres are being built.
These will provide a single window to
provide information on the scheme, as
well as space to conduct social audits,
provide feedback on the quality of the
programme’s implementation, and to
share and discuss ideas.
Intersection of MGNREGA with Other Policy Areas
MGNREGA goes far beyond an immediate concern for social protection and is emerging
as a powerful policy platform that synergises multiple inputs and multi-layered processes
towards basic development goals, including:
 Enhancing economic security: so far, 230 million person days have been generated.
Reports from the field suggest that distress migration has been stemmed in certain
parts of the country. The scheme has helped make local work more easily available
in order to cushion the job crisis during the economic recession. As a national
average, the wage rate has risen from 65 rupees in 2006 to 100 rupees in 2010.
 Creating green jobs: the scheme has created green jobs as a result of the use of local
labour in works related to water conservation and afforestation, thus fostering
economic and ecological security.
 Augmenting water resources and efficiency in water use: 50 per cent of 46 million works
relate to water conservation.
 Enabling planned convergence with other development programmes, such as water
resources, afforestation and agricultural productivity.
 Strengthening food security by promoting agricultural production.
 Adapting to the adverse effects of climate change.
 Strengthening democratic processes by means of greater autonomy among
grassroots institutions.Poverty in Focus    11
Promoting Equity and Access to
Pathways Out of Poverty
The legal design promotes equity.
One-third of the work opportunities are
to be earmarked for women. Along with
the provisions for local employment,
equal wages and work flexibility, this
has resulted in women’s participation
approximating more than 50 per cent.
Independent studies indicate that
women have gained in self esteem
and are able to contribute to domestic
income, that expenditure has diversified
and that women have a greater role in
private and public decision making.
Scheduled tribes and castes comprise
65 per cent of the workforce, and work
taken up on their individual land
holdings is helping to diversify their
livelihoods and increasing their income.
MGNREGA is also helping to “formalise”
informal workers. It has given them legal
rights, an identity through the job card
and an account in the formal financial
network. Workers’ unique identity
numbers and job cards also enable the
“convergence” of multiple investments in
the same person—for example, by
facilitating access to skills development,
education and health, and insurance.
The proof of identity provided by the
identity number and the job card is also
encouraging MGNREGA workers to access
the benefits of income generating
programmes in order to find pathways
out of poverty. The demand-side policy
instruments and the design of works
therefore create an “intersectorality”
and open up development possibilities
that go beyond the provision of a basic
social safety net.
Conclusions:
Gains to Date and Looking Forward
In India, the architecture of public
policies for inclusive growth has been
defined in major areas: infrastructure
(rural roads, housing, electricity,
water, sanitation); human-resource
development by means of a focus
on basic education and healthcare,
as well as livelihoods through skill
development; income generation and,
in particular, the wage employment
programme—that is, MGNREGA.
There has also been a greater concern to
provide social security through measures
such as old-age pensions, and life and
health insurance. Also viewed as central
to these efforts are the strengthening
of democratic processes—for example,
through decentralisation (for local self
governance), the right to information
(for transparency and public
accountability), and the adoption
of selected rights-based laws
as development policy.
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At the time of the
transition to democracy
in 1994, the social
assistance system in
South Africa was already
notably well developed
for a middle-income country.
A stronger focus on active
labour market policies as
complementary to the
extensive system of
cash transfers is required.
Social Assistance &
Labour Market Policies:
The Case of South Africa
by Ingrid Woolard,
University of Cape Town
Despite improvements, levels of
poverty and inequality in South Africa
remain very high. It is estimated that
about one-quarter of the population
live on less than PPP$1 per day. The Gini
coefficient stands at 0.70 (Leibbrandt et
al., 2010), putting South Africa among the
countries that have the world’s highest
levels of income inequality.
At the time of the transition to democracy
in 1994, the social assistance system in
South Africa was already notably well
developed for a middle-income country.
Post-apartheid, the system has expanded
markedly, with 14 million people (out of
a population of 48 million) now receiving
some form of cash transfer. At 3.5 per cent
of GDP, South Africa’s spending on cash
transfers is more than twice the median
spending of 1.4 per cent of GDP among
developing and transition economies.
There are several kinds of cash transfers
in South Africa, of which the most
important are the state old-age pension,
the disability grant and the child support
grant. Of the 14 million people receiving
social grants in April 2010, 2.5 million were
receiving old-age pensions, 1.3 million
were receiving disability grants and 9.4
million children (aged 0–14) were benefiting
from child support grants. All these
grants are means-tested and unconditional.12 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
The current economic downturn and
this sharp increase in social assistance
expenditures in recent years have
highlighted the importance of the social
security system in alleviating poverty in
South Africa. Over the longer term, the
government faces the challenge of
placing South Africa on a higher growth
path that will create jobs and provide the
fiscal revenue required to sustain and
enhance social programmes. This article
summarises some of the strategies in
place to mitigate household poverty
in the short run, and considers whether
these policies are consistent with the
longer-term objective of reducing
poverty and inequality through
enhanced growth. In addition to the
extensive system of cash transfers,




The Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF)
provides short-term income support to
individuals who are not currently
working because they have lost their job,
have become ill or have taken maternity
leave. Workers who resign voluntarily are
not eligible for unemployment benefits.
Benefits are only paid in the period
immediately following the cessation
of work, and the person must have been
contributing to the UIF at the time of the
event related to the cessation of work.
Benefits may be claimed for up to 238 days.
In the 2009/10 fiscal year, an average of
208,000 people claimed unemployment
benefits each month. This figure is in stark
contrast to the number of unemployed,
which currently stands at 4.1 million.
Thus, while the UIF clearly has an
important role to play in providing
replacement income to the short-term
unemployed with work experience, the
vast majority of the unemployed fall
outside of this system. Unemployment
insurance (in its current form) is a weak
instrument to deal with the risks of
unemployment, much less cover its
longer-term consequences for poverty
and destitution.
Public Works Programmes
In addition to the UIF, South Africa also
has public works programmes to insure
workers against income losses when they
lose their job. These programmes
have been important interventions in
developing countries for many years, and
are particularly effective at addressing
vulnerability to poverty and in crises.
They can significantly mitigate the effects
of negative covariate and idiosyncratic
shocks on poor households. Often, they
provide unskilled manual workers with
short-term employment on projects
such as road building and maintenance,
irrigation infrastructure, reforestation
and soil conservation. Most of the jobs
created are in government-funded
infrastructure projects (for example, road
building) or social projects (such as early
childhood development programmes).
The public works programme in South
Africa, even in its extended version, is
quite limited in coverage and thus plays
a rather small role in the overall social
protection system.
The “Expanded Public Works Programme”
(EPWP) was implemented in 2004, and an
enhanced “EPWP Phase 2” was launched
in 2009. EPWP aims to create productive
employment opportunities by increasing
the labour intensity of all government
programmes. Most EPWP jobs are
in government-funded infrastructure
projects (e.g. road building), but there
are also work opportunities in public
environmental programs (e.g. the removal




Under the aegis of EPWP, all government
bodies and state corporations are
required to make a concerted effort
to increase the use of unskilled labour.
Using public spending, temporary
and generally unskilled employment is
created for the jobless. This temporary
employment is coupled with on-the-job
skills development and training.
The intention is that this will provide
participants leaving the programme
with a better chance of finding
regular employment.
EPWP has grown steadily over the past
five years and the aim is to expand it
further in the second phase launched in
2009, with a view to providing 4.5 million
jobs (with an average duration of 100
days) over a five-year period. EPWP
Many argue that the
social grant system
should be extended
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currently transfers fairly modest amounts
of income to a relatively small number of
households, but the goal is to increase
the scale of the project to provide the
full-time equivalent of more than 400,000
jobs a year over the medium term. If the
state can implement the programme at
this level of intensity, it has the potential
to make a significant contribution to
poverty alleviation by providing
short-term income support.
Cash Transfers
As mentioned earlier, about 14 million
people in South Africa receive cash
transfers. Household survey estimates
suggest that more than half of
households receive at least one cash
transfer. The grants are relatively
generous. For example, the old-age
pension is worth PPP$230 per month,
which is 1.75 times the median per capita
income, and the child support grant is
worth PPP$53 per month per child.
Not surprisingly, therefore, cash transfers
have far-reaching poverty alleviating
implications, particularly for households
that have little connection to the labour
market. The figure disaggregates
household income sources by income
quintile in order to highlight the role
of social assistance grants in providing
income support, especially to lower-
income households.
It is striking that fully two-thirds of the
bottom quintile’s income is from social
assistance grants, and most of this is
from child grants (the child support
grant, the foster care grant and the
care dependency grant combined).
As households move up the income
distribution, labour-market income
becomes increasingly important and
reliance on social assistance
commensurately declines.
Behavioural Effects of the Grants
The inability of poorer households to
invest in the productive capacity of their
members, especially in the education and
health of children, has implications for
the persistence of poverty. Cash transfer
programmes provide a predictable and
reliable source of income that can have
significant effects on the capacity of
households to invest in human and
physical capital, and thus break the
intergenerational transmission of
poverty. There is considerable evidence
(reviewed in Budlender and Woolard,
2006) that cash transfers in South Africa
have positive effects on the
accumulation of human capital, despite
the unconditional nature of the transfers.
Access to either a pension or a child
grant can enhance the health status
of beneficiaries and other household
members by improving their nutrition
and access to healthcare. Second,
there is some evidence that older
people, particularly women, are inclined
to allocate this income in ways that
directly benefit more vulnerable household
members, such as young children.
Evidence for the impact of cash transfers
on the labour supply of beneficiaries and
their household members, however, is
mixed. Basic economic theory suggests
that cash transfers are an injection of
non-labour income into the households
and should therefore have an income
effect on direct and indirect beneficiaries
in the household. Empirical analysis by
Ranchhod (2010) supports the hypothesis
that cash transfers reduce incentives
to work in South Africa. On the other
hand, a cash transfer might assist in
overcoming a liquidity constraint if
Source: Author’s calculations based on SALDRU, 2008.
migrant labourers initially need to draw
resources from the original sending
household. There also seems to be
some empirical support for this
theory (Ardington et al., 2009).
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the social
assistance system in South Africa is
channelling cash transfers into low-income
households and that this income can and
does change the behaviour
of the members of those households.
But the current system, which focuses
on children, the elderly and the disabled,
is something of an artefact of history
rather than a particularly coherent
system. In the absence of comprehensive
social insurance, prime-age adults can
only benefit from social assistance grants
if they are co-resident with a child or an
elderly or disabled person. Many argue
that the social grant system should
be extended to focus directly on the
unemployed who remain uncovered
by other grants. Such arguments are
strengthened by the limitations of the UIF.
It is important to recall, however,
that the contemporary context is
one of a massive post-apartheid
expansion of cash transfers. Further
future expansion has to confront the14 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
issue of fiscal sustainability. Economic
growth has supported the enlargement
of the grants system, and the high
returns in terms of social well-being
have justified this expenditure.
But South Africa confronts a tougher
growth environment over the medium
term and it is unlikely that the country
has the fiscal space to expand cash
transfers dramatically. Clearly, the
overriding goal of economic and social
policy has to be to assimilate many
more of the unemployed into the
labour market, and thus a stronger
focus on active labour market policies as
complementary to the extensive system
of cash transfers is required.
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a standardised form, from
which information will be
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The Case of Bolsa Família
by Sergei Soares,
Institute for Applied Economic
Research (IPEA),
Brazil
Bolsa Família, like other means-
tested cash transfer programmes, has
been much in the limelight since its
creation in 2003. One issue that has not
received much attention, however, is why
so many families remain uncovered even
though the programme’s coverage
comfortably exceeds its target
population. This apparent contradiction
holds an important lesson for many
similar programmes: the importance
of how income is measured and how
targets are defined. Before discussing
that, we need a brief digression on how
Bolsa Família is implemented.
How does Bolsa Família select its
beneficiaries? The process is not
particularly complicated, but it is one in
which partnership between the federal
government and municipal governments
is crucial. The federal government’s
Ministry of Social Development is
responsible for preparing a standardised
form, from which information will be fed
into a computerised single registry called
the Cadastro Único (CadÚnico).
These forms are given to more than 5,000
municipal governments, which then go
looking for the poor.
The municipalities identify the poor by
various means: from self-declarations
of poverty to detailed scrutiny, from
active to passive. Some (not many)
municipalities base their efforts on
pre-existing structures, such as the family
health programme. Others have created
new and lively structures to identify
and register the poor. Most small
municipalities leave the task to their
social workers, who for the most part
have taken up the challenge with vigour.
Many large municipalities have taken a
more passive approach, relying on the
poor to register in social service centres.
Some municipalities take care to verify
the information that the poor provide
about themselves, particularly regarding
their income, but many do not.
Whichever approach is used, the
municipal governments then register the
poor and send the forms online to the
Caixa Econômica Federal, a state-owned
bank. This applies the eligibility and
priority criteria defined by the ministry,
including the calculation of family per
capita income, and then selects the
beneficiary families and calculates the
value of their benefit.Poverty in Focus    15
Table




2004 100 8,730 17.2% 8,362 16.5% 41,029 23.1% 39,432         22.2%
2005 100 7,094 13.6% 6,791 13.0% 33,990 18.8% 32,605 18.0%
2006 120 8,643 16.1% 7,974 14.9% 39,382 21.5% 36,606 20.0%
2007 120 7,456 13.6% 6,998 12.7% 33,620 18.2% 31,561 17.1%
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The CadÚnico information is checked
against other administrative records,
such as formal-sector mandatory
registries, and income inconsistencies
are identified and passed on to the
municipalities, which must verify
them before benefits are suspended
or cancelled. Since the vast bulk of the
poor’s income is informal, however,
only a minority of registries show
income inconsistencies.
In theory, the benefits are paid
for two years and then re-evaluated.
Of course, many municipalities
take much longer than two years
to reassess their poor, something that
has been addressed recently with a new
form for the Cadastro Único and a pre-
defined flow of mandatory updates
based on a beneficiary’s card number.
Since Bolsa Família is not an entitlement,
some kind of quota or target is necessary.
In other words, since the scheme is a
defined budget and not a defined
benefit programme, the amount
of resources available has to be
determined at the beginning of the
year. Since municipalities have such an
important role in Bolsa Família, municipal
targets must also be set.
In practice, the municipal targets are
somewhat flexible and municipalities
that exceed their targets can be assigned
benefits taken from those that did not
meet them. This is important, because
the municipal targets are set by means
of a poverty map based on small
area estimates using data from the
2000 census to calculate poverty
numbers by municipality. The census
information is likely to be relatively
out of date by now.
The number of families in Brazil
whose per capita income falls short
of the Bolsa Família cut-off point
was estimated using the 2001 and
2002 household survey (the Pesquisa
Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios,
PNAD) and this number was set as
the national target. The 2001–2003
period was characterised by low
economic growth, and the decline in
inequality was still quite incipient.
The number of families under the
Bolsa Família poverty line was
estimated at 11 million, and thus the
first coverage target was set.
Because of budgetary and administrative
restrictions, the target was only achieved
at the end of 2006. Between 2004 and
2008 (the date of the latest available
PNAD), as a result of economic growth
and the fall in inequality, the incomes of
the poorest quintile grew by an impressive
40 per cent. Although some of this
growth was due to Bolsa Família itself,
incomes net of the programme’s benefits
grew by about 30 per cent. One would
expect the coverage targets to fall
accordingly. The table shows that
the number of poor (eligible)
families fell to 6.2 million in 2008.
Such a favourable evolution of the
income distribution should have led to
full coverage of all eligible families long
before the national target of 11 million
beneficiaries was met in 2006. The
Ministry of Social Development should
have been returning money to the
federal budget and cancelling benefits.
But this is not what happened. At the
end of 2008, the coverage situation was
somewhat paradoxical. There were 11.2
million families receiving benefits, but
there were another 2.5 million registered
as eligible in the Cadastro Único that were
not receiving the benefit. This was in a
year in which, according to the PNAD,
only 6.2 million families were poor
(eligible). Why did this happen?
The first hypotheses that come to mind
are widespread fraud or poor targeting.
The National Audit Office’s report is quite




another 2.5 million were
registered as eligible
in the Cadastro Único
but were not receiving
the benefit.
This was in a year in
which, according to the
PNAD, only 6.2 million
families were poor
(eligible). Why did
this happen?16 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
clear that fraud affects, at most, a few
thousand of the 11 million benefits, so
widespread fraud is not a real possibility.
Various academic contributions, such as
Soares et al. (2010), show that Bolsa
Família targeting is excellent, with
concentration coefficients close to -0.52.
The remaining possibility is that the
relevant income definition for Bolsa
Família is not compatible with how
the coverage targets were set.
According to a decree of 12 March 2008,
the Bolsa Família benefit shall be paid for
a minimum of two years regardless of
any income variation during that period.
If the incomes of the poor are subject
to wide volatility, then a household
whose income falls below the Bolsa
Família threshold in a given month can
receive a benefit and not lose it when
its per capita income rises above
the limit for a few months.
This means that the number of
households eligible for Bolsa Família
benefits—the number whose income fell
beneath the poverty line in at least one
of the previous 24 months—will be
larger than the number of households
whose income falls beneath the
poverty line in a given month.
If coverage targets are calculated
using a transversal definition of income
(income in a given month) but benefits
are granted using a longitudinal
definition (income during the next
24 months), the targets will always
underestimate coverage needs.
This, of course, depends on the volatility
of the poor’s incomes. To measure this
volatility, a panel survey is necessary.
Given the lack of a national panel, we
can use the monthly employment survey
(Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, PME), which
interviews households in metropolitan
areas for four consecutive months.
Using this survey, we calculated both
transversal and longitudinal poverty
and compared the two. The figure
shows our results for 2007.
The message is clear. While transversal
poverty remains more or less constant
at 11.8–12 per cent of the metropolitan
population, four-month longitudinal
poverty rises to 18.3 per cent, almost
50 per cent higher than the
transversal estimates.
The monthly marginal increase is
decreasing: 3.5 percentage points from
the first to the second month, 1.8 points
from the second to the third, and 1.2
points from the third to the fourth.
If the same pattern holds for the
remaining months, we estimate that
two-year longitudinal poverty is about
twice the transversal poverty figure.
If this is the case, then any coverage
target estimated using a cross-sectional
household survey will be a gross
underestimate of real coverage needs.
In this context, the government’s decision
to increase the number of beneficiaries
during the crisis, when the transversal
poverty indicator had actually decreased
relative to the initial 2003 estimates, is in
line with the conceptual shift triggered
by the 2008 decree. Bolsa Família’s
potential beneficiaries should be those
who are likely to fall into poverty within
a two-year period.
This is likely to decrease undercoverage
of Bolsa Família while at the same time
redefining leakage indicators based
on transversal indicators. 
Soares, Sergei, R. P. Ribas and F. V. Soares
(2010). ‘Targeting and Coverage of the
Bolsa Família Programme: Why Knowing
What You Measure Is Important in Choosing
the Numbers’ . Paper prepared for the
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Brazil’s approach
to prioritising access to
healthcare in its patent
process holds valuable
lessons for India and
South Africa.
On the other hand,
India’s success in building
a competitive and, to some
extent, vertically integrated
pharmaceutical industry are
of interest to the other
IBSA countries.
South Africa has valuable
experience in regulatory tools
to ensure a transparent
pricing mechanism.
by Radhika Lal ,
International Policy Centre
for Inclusive Growth Health Innovation,
IPR and Access to Essential
Drugs in IBSA countries
The IBSA Delhi Summit Declaration
of 15 October 2008 points to the IBSA
leaders’ agreement on the need to
establish trilateral cooperation in the
field of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR).
The aim is to promote a balanced
international intellectual property regime
and to make a meaningful contribution
to the economic and social progress
of developing countries by ensuring
access to knowledge and healthcare.
The IBSA Academic Forum, held in
Brasilia on 12–13 April 2010, included
a session on this theme.
It sought to facilitate knowledge-sharing
among the three countries on strategies
to promote universal and affordable
access to essential drugs (particularly
for HIV/AIDS). It also aimed to consider
IPR issues in the context of access to
essential medicines and with regard
to the development of innovation
capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector.
Another goal was to develop a work
programme for the periods between
summits, so as to help inform IBSA’s
contribution to global policy debates
on these issues and to facilitate further
exchange among the three countries on
priority issues as they emerge. This article
provides a brief review of the proceedings.
Work on this theme is grounded in the
understanding that although there are a
number of barriers to achieving universal
and affordable access to the essential
drugs in the three countries, one of the
most critical is the IPR regime.
This has significant implications for the
nature of domestic intellectual property
laws and licensing agreements, and for
the terms on which countries can undertake
the manufacture and/or import and
export of essential medications.
The session on health innovation at the
IBSA Academic Forum began by looking
at the current state of access to essential
drugs for HIV/AIDS. Several presenters
highlighted the negative impact of
the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) as it relates to
access to essential drugs in IBSA countries.
Juliana Vallini of Brazil’s Ministry of
Health pointed out that Brazil’s adoption
of TRIPS had led to a significant rise in
the prices of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs).
That in turn had increased the financial
burden for the government-led HIV/AIDS
programme, which focuses on providing
universal and free access to drugs for all
those infected with HIV.
Jonathan Berger highlighted the
implications of TRIPS for South Africa,
particularly as regards ensuring
affordable access to the newest
generation of HIV/AIDS drugs and to
some previous-generation ARVs such as
lopinavir/r. Affordable access to the latest
generation of drugs is essential because
of their lower toxicity, and because
patients develop resistance to previous
treatment combinations/regimes.
He pointed out that South Africa is also
being affected indirectly by the impact
of TRIPS in other IBSA countries.
Most importantly, South Africa secures
essential drugs from India but the
pipeline of generic ARVs in India
seems to be narrowing because of TRIPs.
Also significant are pressures on individual
countries to adopt additional TRIPs plus
provisions in free trade agreements.
These can have implications for the other
IBSA countries if they affect the terms
on which essential medicines can be
exported from or imported into the
country signing the agreement.18 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
South Africa’s experience
shows that civil society,
using a competition
law, can be very effective
in promoting flexibility
arrangements for patents
through the granting of
“non-voluntary” licenses.
1.  See GTPI/REBRIP (2010), ‘Written Comment
on the 2010 USTR Special 301’.
2. For example, civil society sectors of India and Brazil
joined forces to make full use of available provisions
in national laws to oppose the granting of patents
to key AIDS drugs such as Tenofovir.
In India, civil society groups joined by counterparts from
Brazil (who were also opposing the granting of patents
in Brazil) worked together on a pre-grant opposition,
a provision available under the Indian patent law,
on the grounds that Tenovofir was a previously
known compound and therefore not a ’new’ drug.
As a result of this initiative, the drug is not under
patent protection in either of these two countries.
3. For example, Hunter et al. (2009).
Making Use of TRIPS Flexibilities:
Effective Practices and Challenges
in the IBSA Countries
The presenters explored some national
experiences of using TRIPS flexibilities
granted by the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.
Juliana Vallini outlined Brazil’s policy
framework and pointed to a number of
important institutional innovations that
seek to align property rights and public
health concerns more effectively.
These include the role of the Health
Ministry in analysing patent applications
for pharmaceutical products and
processes, and the need to secure prior
consent from Brazil’s National Health
Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) before a
patent can be granted, as well as Brazil’s
innovative institutional coordination
mechanism, the Interministerial Group
for Intellectual Property in Brazil (GIPI).1
In a complementary presentation on
Brazil, Zich Moysés Junior pointed out
that the focus on “health” is multifaceted
and interlined—it includes attention
to citizenship rights as well as to
investments, innovations, income and
employment. He described the structure
of and the approach taken to the “Health
Industrial Complex”, in light of the
priority that Brazil accords to improving
its innovative capacity in order to
increase public access to healthcare.
The panellists identified current
challenges and opportunities for
collaboration in the pricing of essential
medicines in the three countries. Juliana
Vallini detailed how the prices of several
critical medicines had been negotiated,
and highlighted the cost savings
involved. She pointed out, however,
that prices in some other countries are
still lower than those Brazil has been able
to negotiate, suggesting that the countries
could benefit from information sharing
and collaboration in several areas.
Anban Pillay described the several
interventions undertaken through the
adoption of a comprehensive approach
to pricing regulation, which seeks to
lower medicine prices and arrive at a
transparent pricing system in South
Africa. He highlighted a number of areas
of common concern and potential
interest for the three IBSA countries.
These included sharing information on
drug prices, sources of low-cost drugs
and co-effectiveness analysis of new
drugs. He stressed the importance of
training programmes to develop capacity
in local production, and the need to
foster linkages between universities in
IBSA countries. Both Juliana Vallini and
Jonathan Berger emphasised the vital
role of civil society in the IBSA countries in
advocating the use of TRIPS flexibilities.
2
The final presentations looked at the
impact of TRIPS on the production side
and explored the implications for access
to drugs, as well as innovation capabilities
and possibilities.
The presenters pointed to a number of
emerging challenges, such as the matter
of counterfeit products, as well as
possibilities for collaboration between
the IBSA countries to identify a new
approach to innovation in the
post-TRIPS context.
Biswajit Dhar of India indicated that
the issue of counterfeiting applies to
both branded and generic products
in principle, but that some of the
approaches to defining “counterfeit”
at the intergovernmental, organisational
and, in some cases, bilateral level pose
particular challenges for generic drug
producers from countries such as India,
as well for patients in the IBSA countries.
He indicated that “counterfeiting” should
be defined clearly, keeping in mind the
flexibilities available under TRIPS, and
that attempts made by the “pharma
majors” to equate “counterfeit” and
“substandard” medicines should be
challenged. For more details see Biswajit
Dhar’s article in this issue of Poverty in Focus.
A New South-South Model for the
Development of Drugs for
Neglected Diseases?
Sudip Chaudhuri pointed out
that there are few or no drugs for
neglected diseases, especially “very
neglected diseases” such as African
trypanosomiasis, leishmaniasis and
Chagas disease.
There has been an increase in support
to research and development (R&D) for
drugs to tackle neglected diseases on the
part of some not-for-profit organisationsPoverty in Focus    19
and some multinational corporations
(MNCs), but it was widely believed that
more should be done, particularly by
developing countries themselves.
In the post-TRIPS phase of developing
new drugs, pharmaceutical companies
from the South, including India, face
difficulties in promoting drugs that
they have developed independently.
He indicated that there was not a single
instance of a drug being developed
elsewhere but successfully marketed
in developed countries, particularly in
the United States and Western Europe,
without the involvement of MNCs, since
the companies basically develop new
molecules up to a certain stage and then
license them out to partners from
developed countries, mainly MNCs.
He also pointed out that there was a real
opportunity here for the IBSA countries
to focus on neglected diseases and to
develop a new innovation model that
could facilitate a fuller development
of their production and marketing
capabilities. Given India’s elaborate
public R&D infrastructure, for example,
one approach might be to connect
the country’s existing public-private
partnerships with organisations in Brazil
and South Africa, so as to conduct clinical
trials and secure regulatory approvals,
and to focus marketing on these and
other developing countries with a view
to expanding the focus to developed
countries in the future.
The six presentations highlighted a
number of complementary good
practices in the three countries.
These included the Brazilian government’s
role in promoting universal access to
antiretroviral drugs, as well as in
compulsory licensing
3 and negotiations
with firms to lower drugs prices. Brazil’s
approach to prioritising access to
healthcare in its patent process
holds valuable lessons for India
and South Africa.
On the other hand, India’s success
in building a competitive and, to
some extent, vertically integrated
pharmaceutical industry highlights
important production and innovation
capacities that are of interest to
the other IBSA countries.
Its R&D infrastructure in the public sector
and its use of private-public partnerships
to transform public R&D activities into
products provide a basis on which to
devise  a new product-development model.
South Africa has valuable experience in
regulatory tools to ensure a transparent
pricing mechanism. Moreover, South
Africa’s experience shows that civil
society, using a competition law, can be
very effective in promoting flexibility
arrangements for patents through the
granting of “non-voluntary” licenses.
Conclusions and Issues for Follow-Up
Several issues were identified
for follow-up:
 sharing strategies to make better use
of health-related TRIPS flexibilities,
including compulsory licensing and
Bolar provisions;
 information sharing in selected
critical areas, particularly with regard
to drug prices, sources of low-cost
drugs, co-effectiveness analysis
of new drugs, and training
programmes that develop
capacity in local production;
 identifying potential joint R&D and
product development, starting with
a focus on drugs for neglected
diseases; this could enhance the
availability of alternatives on
the market in all developing
countries by building on and
strengthening R&D and production
capabilities, and by leveraging
the large internal markets in
the IBSA countries;
 mechanisms to strengthen
collaboration on policy issues at
the global level: strengthen global
collaboration, including in the
WHO-led Global Strategy and Plan
of Action on Public Health,
Innovation and Intellectual Property,
as well as with regard to critical
emerging issues such as the
definition and regulation of
“counterfeit” drugs; and
 collaboration with civil society
in the three countries: build on
earlier collaboration to oppose the
granting of patents to key AIDS
drugs such as Tenofovir. 
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While the laws apply
to both branded and
generic drugs, there appear
to be significant attempts to
equate authorised generics
with counterfeit products.
When it was first
introduced in the
trade lexicon, the term





or applied “without the
consent of the person
having the right to the
protection of the trademark
or trade name under
the legislation of the
country of importation” .
Generic drugs have been critical to
reducing the cost of and increasing
access to a variety of essential medicines
in developing countries. A number of
related initiatives under the umbrella of
anti-counterfeiting pose challenges in
this regard. The emerging regime weakens
the distinction between substandard
medicines (which is essentially an issue
of product quality and is of critical
concern to health authorities and
patients alike) and counterfeit medicines
(which is essentially a trademark issue).
While the laws apply to both branded
and generic drugs, there appear to be
significant attempts to equate authorised
generics with counterfeit products.
To some, “counterfeit” may seem to be a
fairly technical issue best left to lawyers,
but it has rightly attracted widespread
interest in public health discussions and
is of particular concern to the IBSA
countries, given India’s production of
generics and the importance of such
generics in ensuring more affordable
and equitable access to these drugs in
Brazil and South Africa. The issue is also
important because of concerns that the
European Union (EU) and other partners
are negotiating or planning to negotiate
the inclusion of such anti-counterfeiting
measures in free trade agreements that
are due to be concluded with a number
of countries of interest.
Trade in Counterfeit Goods and
its Relationship to Intellectual
Property Rights
The trade in so-called counterfeit goods
has assumed controversial proportions in
recent years, particularly after authorised
generic pharmaceutical products
exported by Indian firms to Latin America
and Africa were seized by EU customs
authorities when they were being
transhipped through European ports.
There were more than 20 seizures as
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European Commission directive that
allows the seizure of goods suspected
of infringing the rights of intellectual
property holders, even when the drugs
are unpatented or off-patent in the
countries of origin and destination, and
when the goods are merely in transit—
that is, they have not entered the
customs territory of any EU member
state (EU Council, 2003).
The EU has clarified that the seized
shipments were released later, but
inordinate delays in transporting the
products to their final destinations not
only acted as a strong deterrent to trade
(thus affecting the commercial interests
of the exporting firms), but also denied
patients in the importing countries
access to crucial lifesaving medicines.
These seizures attracted further attention
because they came at a time when efforts
are underway in several global fora to
strengthen the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property
rights (IPRs), ostensibly to prevent a
proliferation of trade in counterfeit
goods. Perhaps the most important
aspect of these initiatives, however, is
that they appear to be a continuation of
discussions on trade in counterfeit goods
and its relationship to IPRs that first took
place under the aegis of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
during the Tokyo Round of multilateral
trade negotiations.
The issue of trade in counterfeit
goods was introduced into the GATT
negotiations in 1978, when the United
States proposed an agreement to deal
with “commercial counterfeiting”.
When it was first introduced in the trade
lexicon, the term “counterfeit” was used
to encompass all products to which
spurious trademarks or trade names were
affixed or applied “without the consent
of the person having the right to the
protection of the trademark or tradePoverty in Focus    21
name under the legislation of the
country of importation”. The intent
of the United States was to develop a
multilaterally agreed set of disciplines to
prevent counterfeit goods “from entering
or re-entering commerce”. It was clarified
that “parallel imports” were not to be
considered as “counterfeit”.
The United States, however, could not
persuade the GATT members to address
this matter during the Tokyo Round,
mainly because it came at the very end
of the six-year multilateral trade talks.
The issue of counterfeit goods trade was
eventually included in the work programme
of the GATT at the end of the ministerial
meeting in 1982. The ministers agreed to
examine the justification of using the
GATT framework to address the trade
aspects of commercial counterfeiting.
The problem of counterfeit medicines
was first addressed at the international
level in 1985, at the Conference of
Experts on the Rational Use of Drugs, in
Nairobi. The meeting recommended that
the World Health Organisation (WHO),
together with other international and
intergovernmental organisations, study
the feasibility of setting up a clearing
house to collect data and to inform
governments about the nature and
extent of counterfeiting. The World
Health Assembly took note of this
recommendation, and in 1988 adopted a
resolution (WHA41.16) which requested
the Director General of the WHO to
initiate programmes to prevent and
detect the export, import and smuggling
of falsely labelled, counterfeited or
substandard pharmaceutical
preparations. This resolution was
substantially problematical inasmuch
as it used the terms “counterfeit” and
“substandard” interchangeably,
which in our view is rather erroneous.
In 1999, Resolution WHA52.19 on the
revised drug strategy requested the
WHO’s Director General to support
member states in their efforts to combat
the manufacture, trade and use of
counterfeit medical products. Despite the
above initiatives, it was not until 1992
that the WHO developed a definition of
counterfeit medicines. A joint meeting of
the WHO and the International Federation
of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and
Associations (IFPMA) provided a
definition of counterfeit medicines.
According to this definition, “counterfeit
medicine is one which is deliberately and
fraudulently mislabelled with respect to
identity and/or source”. It also added that
counterfeiting can apply to both branded
and generic products, and counterfeit
products may include products with the
correct ingredients or with the wrong
ingredients, without active ingredients,
with insufficient active ingredients or
with fake packaging.
Efforts by the WHO to address the
problem of counterfeiting received a boost
in 2006 through the WHO conference on
“Combating Counterfeit Drugs: Building
Effective International Collaboration”.
The Declaration of Rome, which was
adopted at the end of that conference,
recommended that the WHO should lead
the establishment of an International
Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting
Taskforce (IMPACT) of governmental,
non-governmental and international
institutions, which would seek to
improve cooperation between various
stakeholders so as to take measures
against counterfeit medical products.
It should be mentioned here that the
international conference that was
convened to address the problem of
“counterfeit drugs” adopted a resolution
that also included “medical products”.
According to the definition proposed
by the taskforce, a medical product
is counterfeit when “there is a false
representation in relation to its identity,
history or source”. The proposed
definition marked a notable shift
from the WHO definition of counterfeit
medicines dating from 1992, in that
“history” has been added.
In its Sixty-First Session, the World
Health Assembly took the discussion
on counterfeit medical products further.
A report by the WHO Secretariat underlined
the initiatives taken by IMPACT, including
the taskforce’s future plans. One of IMPACT’s
major tasks was reported as “creating
initiatives that focus on the specific
needs and problems related to counterfeit
medical products in sub-Saharan Africa”
(WHO, 2008a). A notable follow-up to this
report was the presentation of a draft
The issue of “counterfeit”
products is of particular




of such generics in
ensuring more affordable
and equitable access to
these drugs in Brazil
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resolution on counterfeit medical
products by Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria,
Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates, the
focus of which was to strengthen
the work of IMPACT (WHO, 2008b).
These initiatives have had spillover
effects on the laws of a few countries
whose legislation virtually eliminates
the distinction between an authorised
generic and a counterfeit medicine.
Kenya’s Anti-Counterfeit Act of 2008
defines counterfeiting in a very broad
manner, which in all likelihood could
include genuine generics within the
purview of counterfeiting. The latter
has been defined as “actions” such as
manufacturing, production, labelling,
packing and so on “without the authority
of the owner of any intellectual property
right subsisting in Kenya or elsewhere in
respect of protected goods”.
The proposal mentioned above is
significant in light of counterfeit
goods-trade developments in several
international fora, including the World
Customs Organisation, the World
Intellectual Property Organisation
and the G8. The most significant of the
recent initiatives, however, is the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), a
plurilateral accord proposed by the United
States and two other proponents of a
stronger intellectual property rights
regime, the EU and Japan.
Proposals for an Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA)
The first steps towards the development
of ACTA were taken during the 2005 G8
Summit in Gleneagles, where Japan
suggested stricter regulations and
enforcement provisions to combat “piracy
and counterfeiting”. Commentators have
pointed out that the G8 statement
“Reducing IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting
through More Effective Enforcement”
was, in effect, the first official step
towards what would become ACTA
(Shaw, 2008). The latter, as proposed,
builds on the recommendations made
at the Global Congress on Combating
Counterfeiting and the G8, and
focuses on international cooperation,
enforcement and legislation (Dordi, 2008).
The legislative and enforcement issues
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fraudulently mislabelled
with respect to identity
and/or source”.
several areas, including border measures
as well as intellectual property protection
and enforcement. Some of the proposals
tabled so far are considerably more
stringent than the provisions of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and
include the civil-judicial proceedings
proposed in ACTA to compensate for
damages arising from infringements.
There is no denying that the efforts
in the ACTA negotiations to strengthen
IPR standards under the guise of anti-
counterfeit trade could have far-reaching
implications for trade in authorised generic
products. The proposed enforcement
mechanisms under ACTA can easily
stifle trade in these products, ostensibly
to protect the “legitimate interests” of
intellectual property owners, thus
grievously affecting access to affordable
medicines in large parts of the developing
world. The emerging regime not only
weakens the distinction between
substandard medicines (which is essentially
an issue of product quality) and counterfeit
medicines (which is essentially a trademark
issue), but also tries to equate authorised
generics to counterfeit products. 
Dordi, C. (2008). Impact of Counterfeiting on
International Trade: Comments on Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).
Brussels, Directorate General External
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The political leverage and
normative legitimacy of IBSA
and the new plurilateralism
will lie in the countries’
collective understanding,
if they use this power
for the greater common
interest of as many people
and countries as possible.
The plurilateralism
used by groups like
IBSA could add value to
multilateralism if it can
connect the largely excluded
countries of the South to the
blocs of the North, if it goes
beyond the interests of




interests have traditionally come
together in subgroups to formulate
and negotiate policies. Historically,
plurilateralism has been used outside
the multilateral framework for linkages
beyond regional alliances. It is criticised
as a disruptive process. (Oelgemoller,
2007; Hettne, 2004) but also supported
as a safeguard against hegemony.
(Polanyi, 1945: 87). The multiple crises
(climate, financial, ecological, food,
security) arising from neoliberal
globalisation offer reason for plurilateral
formations such as IBSA and the
Brazil-Russia-India-China (BRIC) grouping.
Emerging countries are marked by
their high growth rates, influence
on international economics, stable
political systems, high military
expenditure, strategic partnerships
and impact on the geopolitics of their
regions. This makes them attractive
to countries in the North and to least
developed countries in the South.
The North would like the emerging
countries to converge with their agenda.
This would maintain the asymmetrical
international power system.
The global South would like emerging
countries to join their platforms, such as
the G77, so as to further their interests,
which differ from those of the North.
In the Doha Round, for example, they
leaned on India and China against
Northern protectionism in the areas
of agricultural subsidies and
labour standards.
The emerging countries thus have to
choose from a menu of policy options
and strategies. The interest of IBSA
will be served if they:
 use their collective voice in
international decision making;
IBSA, Plurilateralism
and the Global South
by Kamal Mitra Chenoy,
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
India
 bring the voices of the global
South to the North;
 build a bridge between the excluded
and the powerful for the joint
resolution of common problems; and
 link plurilateralism with
multilateralism.
IBSA’s task should include the following:
 pose a sustained challenge to
asymmetrical power relations and
legitimise a pro-people paradigm;
 promote the democratisation of
international institutions;
 forge links with regional institutions
of the South;
 widen discussions on the climate,
financial, food and security crises;
 include grassroots communities and
civil society movements, and form
alliances with them.
Foreign Policies and Development
Strategies
IBSA is committed to a multipolar world,
independent foreign policies and
support for the South (Brasilia
Declaration, June 2003). The members
argue for a negotiated settlement on
Iran, and for working together on climate
change, reform of the United Nations,
terrorism, building democracy and world
trade talks. The normative value of IBSA
as a “strong moral force in today’s
unsettled world”, in the words of Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (16 April
2010), reinforces the idea of building a
more equitable international order.
IBSA has high growth rates and common
problems, including: inequity and poverty,
internal displacement and migration,
resource conflicts, insurgencies and
so on. The neoliberal paradigm of
privatisation and corporatisation
reinforces these problems. Civil society
is dynamic in the IBSA countries
and mobilises for environmental24 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
and ecological concerns, opposing
displacement caused by large dams,
special economic zones and mining, and
being regarded as a threat to established
power dynamics (Oelgemoller, 2007).
IBSA leaders recognise the need to share
development initiatives and alternative
paradigms that help the global South
(IBSA Forum, 16 April 2010).
The IBSA countries and those of the
South share common anticolonial
memories and have the experience of
collective negotiation. The IBSA countries’
status as middle powers gives them the
capacity to intervene in regional and
global processes.
Clearly, then, the political leverage and
normative legitimacy of IBSA and the
new plurilateralism will lie in their
collective understanding, if they use this
power for the greater common interest
of as many people and countries as
possible. This form of plurilateral
network can help build a bridge
between the G20 and the G77.
IBSA, Plurilateralism and the
Multiple Crises
The multiple crises have offered
an opportunity to re-examine both
globalisation and development models.
They have shown the need for an
ecological, equitable and sustainable
development based on inclusion,
rights and human security.
The IBSA foreign ministers accept that
large parts of the world have not
benefited from globalisation and want
policies that are inclusive, integrative,
humane and equitable (Brasilia
Declaration, June 2003). A common
position on food, climate and security
will help save resources and resolve
problems. In order to succeed,
plurilateral fora need to work in
synch with regional formations.
The collective weight of the South still
remains more than groupings like the
G20, and IBSA should not lose this
principle of inclusive decision making.
There are many examples of states
making changes in response to civil
society/peoples’ movements: India has
made the right to information, work and
basic education a constitutional right;
China is investing heavily in renewable
energy systems; Brazil has made progress
on land reform. IBSA should ensure as a
benchmark that each country’s civil
societies provide an input into domestic
and external policies, and that they are
consulted on governance and
development models.
Avoiding the Pitfalls
Many smaller countries fear that on
issues such as climate change, which
seriously affect their future, countries like
India, Brazil and China in a group like
BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and
China) will accede to the interests of
countries in the North. IBSA and BASIC
will have to find a new and pragmatic
style of negotiation, one that continues
to offer protection to the smaller
countries but that is connected
to the larger process.
The Priority of Sustainable Development
The influence and strength of plurilateral
alliances depend largely on their
adopting of sustainable development
approaches that are people-centred,
devising egalitarian policies in which the
emphasis is not only on the autonomous
power of capital but on how it can
address the needs of labour and the
mass of the poor. Policies that include
official funding should prioritise job
creation, social protection and rights.
Capital should be regulated to
strengthen the welfare state. Developing
domestic industry, including small and
medium industries, would generate
employment and thus deepen urban and
rural markets, increase consumption and
production, and create even more jobs.
Such sustainable development would
have a “demonstration effect” and
influence other countries. A vibrant
egalitarian economy would insulate
the IBSA countries from external
pressure or economic shocks, and
increase their political leverage in
international relations.
Possibilities and Benchmarks for IBSA
The IBSA countries should aim
to ensure that:
 their collective voice is heard in the
most senior decision making bodies
and in multilateral fora;
IBSA and this form of
plurilateral network
can help form a bridge
between the G20
and the G77.Poverty in Focus    25
 the voices of the South inform the
IBSA forum and are part of the agenda;
 they encourage the countries of the
South to promote their common
agendas, including coordination
on climate change, deeper
democratisation, pluralism, regional
solidarity, disarmament, and gender
equity-based development;
 IBSA is part of the solution in
eliminating developing-world debt,
transforming North-South relations,
introducing a genuinely fair trading
system, helping the poorest
communities with gender-equitable
and inclusive development;
 they devise a paradigm of
development that is pro-people
at its core;
 IBSA foreign policies are geared to
strengthening links with the South
on matters such as globalisation,
security and restructuring multilateral
institutions such as the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund and
the UN Security Council;
 they work for the reform of the
United Nations as a whole in
a way that gives more powers to the
General Assembly, rather than solely
reform of the Security Council, in
which a few have veto powers.
Conclusions
Globalisation has led to the
re-arrangement of the international
system and the rise of new emerging
powers. These powers still do not have
adequate voice to match their capacity,
but if they come together in plurilateral
fora they can acquire more leverage and
voice. The multiple crises in the areas of
economics, ecology and security cannot
be addressed by liberal triumphalism and
exclusive groupings.
Despite its unwieldiness, multilateralism
is the only way forward. If IBSA is to gain
credibility, its voice has to be based on
inclusive agendas of the global South.
This would reflect what analysts have
regarded as a new multilateralism (Cox,
1997,1999) in which domestic and foreign
policies arise from the inputs of social
movements. Plurilateralism does not
fragment multilateralism.
The IBSA countries can be members
of bilateral and multilateral
frameworks simultaneously.
As far as the future is concerned, a
mixture of regional, multilateral and
other such blocs is the likely scenario
(Hettne, 2004). The plurilateralism used
by groups like IBSA could add value
to multilateralism if it can connect the
largely excluded countries of the South
to the blocs of the North, if it goes
beyond the interests of capital, and
if it helps create a people-centred
development paradigm. 
Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC)
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IBSA provides a very good
picture of the potential and
limitations of plurilateral
arrangements.
It neither denies the
relevance of multilateralism
nor intends to replace it.
IBSA’s relevance and
international credibility must
derive from the capacity
of the three countries to
translate the opportunities
of working together into
practical outcomes.




evaluations can meet the
challenge of jointly pursuing
convergent interests and
objectives, amplifying
voices in the international
system, and framing new
forms and processes of
global governance.
The growth of interdependence and
the cross-linkages between different
areas observed in recent decades have
spurred an increasing demand for new
forms of governance at different levels.
Internationally, this demand has also
become a central feature of
contemporary politics. Given that
circumstance, multilateralism is now at
stake because of its own limitations in
addressing the demand.
The high degree of politicisation of
what are usually long and painstaking
multilateral negotiations makes decision
making and the forging of basic
convergences a very costly and
difficult endeavour. This hampers the
achievement of policy compromises
among states and prevents the building
of the political and institutional
framework needed for effective
international coordination.
There is also the ever growing
inadequacy of state action to respond
to problems that prompt interest and
activity on the part of various non-state
actors, domestically and internationally.
As Ruggie has pointed out (Ruggie, 1993),
multilateralism still matters, given the
mounting changes and challenges
brought about by globalisation, but it
must adapt to new circumstances in
which the search for innovative and
flexible forms of governance has
become compelling.
In that context, plurilateralism has
emerged as a novel feature of
contemporary international politics,
one through which great powers seek
to maximise political synergies among
themselves and with their followers in
tackling regional and global problems.
Plurilateralism also arises from emerging
powers’ awareness of their actual
and potential roles and responsibilities
in a changing global order. Hence
plurilateralism has brought pragmatism
and flexibility to international politics,
and has reinvigorated a normative
appeal for a more inclusive and
symmetrical world order in both
political and economic terms.
In that respect, plurilateral arrangements
are not meant to replace multilateralism
or simply to provide an alternative to it.
Both ideas are misleading. Plurilateralism
provides flexibility, and flexibility
facilitates convergence, which in turn
fosters political initiatives and makes
them viable. As simple as this statement
might seem, it conveys the sense of
opportunity that plurilateralism
seeks to exploit.
IBSA provides a very good picture of the
potential and limitations of plurilateral
arrangements as described above.
It neither denies the relevance of
multilateralism nor seeks to replace it.
On the contrary, it sets up a political
framework in which India, Brazil and
South Africa envisage not only fostering
trilateral cooperation in different issue
areas, but also sustaining a regular
political dialogue geared to coordinating
positions and developing, to the extent
possible, joint approaches to key global
issues and to the development
challenges they face.
Initially, IBSA was heralded by the three
member countries, as well as by many
scholars, as an innovative political
arrangement that sought to foster
South-South cooperation. India, Brazil
and South Africa came together mindful
of the need to frame a new paradigm for
the international insertion of middle-
income countries. Through IBSA, they
embraced an ambitious agenda of
trilateral cooperation and raised high
expectations of their acting together in
IBSA: The Prospects of a
Plurilateral Arrangement
by Alcides Costa Vaz,
Institute of International Relations,
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multilateral bodies such as the
United Nations and the World Trade
Organisation, giving the global South
an effective voice on issues such as
reform of UN Security Council and the
multilateral trading system. IBSA also
raised expectations among some
key international actors, such as the
European Union, that it would become
an important international player and
thus a potential partner in the
consolidation of multipolarity and
the strengthening of multilateralism
(Gratius, 2008).
In reality, however, IBSA is rather different
and more complex. Seven years after its
launch, most of the assessments of its
performance still generally reflect some
of the positive hopes raised when it was
created. Most of them are very positive
in evaluating IBSA’s novelty and its
potential as a plurilateral arrangement.
At the same time, its lack of substantial
content has been pointed out as its
main liability. In addition, some of the
differences among the three countries
have nourished misgivings about IBSA’s
prospects of consolidating itself as a
relevant point of reference in
international politics.
It is certainly remarkable that three
emerging democratic countries from
somewhat different regional contexts,
with different cultural backgrounds and
lacking meaningful precedents in their
mutual relations but sharing a
willingness to change their international
status, could set up a framework for a
regular political dialogue on issues that
are central to the international agenda.
IBSA’s relevance and effectiveness,
however, cannot be assessed solely in
relation to a formal trilateral agenda that
gives the group a programmatic sense;
nor can it be evaluated only in terms of
the three countries’ ability to carry out a
common political strategy in response
to some of the most pressing issues on
the global agenda. IBSA’s relevance and
international credibility must derive from
the capacity of the three countries to
translate the opportunities of working
together into practical outcomes.
Before it can become an important point
of reference in international politics, IBSA
has to consolidate itself as a significant
player in the foreign policies of each
of its members on issues that might
be relevant for them individually and
collectively. In that regard, it is hard to
avoid the idea that each of the three
members still places a different value on
IBSA. Brazil seems to be the country that
is willing to make the greatest political
investment in IBSA, though many
observers believe that the emergence
of the BRIC grouping (Brazil, Russia,
India and China) seems to have cast
a shadow on it.
Nonetheless, IBSA is still an important
initiative that serves as an instrument
of Brazil´s quest for a more assertive
international profile and an enhanced
status on the global stage. It is practical
for Brazil to convey a sense of
compromise with the ideals, concerns
and objectives of the global South
in the realm of international cooperation.
Unlike IBSA, BRIC is more suited to
helping forge new parameters and
mechanisms of global economic and
political governance, and to bringing
Brazil closer to the world of high
international politics. From Brazil’s
perspective, IBSA and BRIC should not
be regarded as competing or mutually
exclusive. Rather, the two initiatives
should be viewed as complementary
dimensions of the effort to assert
Brazil’s willingness to change its
international status from that of a
widely accepted regional power to
that of an independent, proactive and
influential global actor.
South Africa, in turn, shows signs of
concern that it might be left behind
by its two IBSA partners, given that
the greater international visibility and
interest that BRIC has garnered has
somewhat overshadowed IBSA itself.
In this sense, IBSA seems to be the most
immediate viable bet for South Africa to
remain in or (in the view of some) join
the club of leading emerging countries.
South Africa is therefore genuinely
committed to IBSA’s consolidation.
Like its two partners, however, South
Africa presently lacks enough leverage to
give IBSA the political strength it needs.
India, for its part, seems to regard IBSA
as an important initiative for particular
purposes, but it is clear that IBSA does
not and perhaps cannot address issues
that are among India’s priority strategic
and political concerns. Since India has a
realist bias in pursuing its international
interests, there are no major incentives
for it to accord IBSA the same priority
and the same level of political support
that Brazil and South Africa could be
willing to offer.
More than any other formal aspect of
IBSA, these differences among the three
countries as to what they expect from
the group are precisely the ones that
convey its plurilateral character. Only a
mechanism that is flexible and attractive
enough to accommodate these differing
views and evaluations can meet the
challenge of jointly pursuing convergent
interests and objectives, amplifying
voices in the international system, and
framing new forms and processes of
global governance.
Despite its liabilities and the rise of other
appealing initiatives, IBSA is suited to
the attainment of those aims. Hence it
certainly deserves the political energy
that each of its three members is willing
to give to it. 
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